ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
There is every reason to believe that noncitizens in Canada will benefit from robust protection of international human rights. All the conditions seem to be in place. Canada is a state party to almost all of the major international human rights instruments (with the highly notable exception of the Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their Families); 1 Canada has sought out an international * Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia. Comments to catherine.dauvergne@ ubc.ca. I am grateful to Joyce Bolton and Brian Koh for their work on the data set discussed in this paper, and Robert Russo for his timely and reliable research assistance. I also would like to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for providing funding for this project. leadership role in human rights protections; Canada applies the constitutional rights framework to everyone, regardless of citizenship, and interprets it in light of international human rights commitments; 2 and the Canadian population remains supportive of a broad immigration policy, one of the only major Western democracies where this is still the case. 3 Canada has embraced multiculturalism, has a proud history of immigration, and its people were awarded the United Nations' High Commissioner for Refugees' Nansen Medal in 1986 in recognition of extraordinary and dedicated service to refugees. 4 This may be as good as it gets.
Against this backdrop, it is particularly important to understand why noncitizens in Canada often do not benefit from the protections offered by international human rights. Indeed, in an important series of high-level decisions over the past decade, the Supreme Court of Canada has lagged behind the (former) House of Lords, 5 the High Court of Australia, 6 the Supreme Court of New Zealand, 7 and the United States Supreme Court 8 in integrating international standards into its analysis and decision making when it comes to questions of key rights for foreigners. This is not to say that outcomes have consistently been worse for noncitizens in the Supreme Court of Canada, although this is often the case.
The key point is, rather, that the Supreme Court of Canada presently appears less likely to engage with international human rights norms either as a direct source of rights entitlements or as an interpretive device for Canadian constitutional rights, at least in cases that relate to noncitizens. 9 The list of issues where the Supreme Court of Canada has lagged behind one, many, or even all of these courts is extensive and includes a number of rights that have been identified as particularly important to noncitizens. 10 For example, on the crucial issue of deportation to face a risk of torture, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that while international law establishes an absolute 10. For example, through inclusion in the ICRMW, supra note 1. For a discussion outlining this theory of the value of this Convention which, to a great extent, repeats rights commitments made in generally applicable documents but ties them to the specific circumstances of migrant workers, see Ryszard Cholewinski, prohibition on removal in this circumstance, Canadian law provides a narrow opening in which the executive branch can balance the risk of torture against Canadian public interest and may deport, without judicial intervention, in rare but appropriate cases. 11 With regard to indefinite detention without trial, the Supreme Court of Canada approved the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act provisions that can lead to this possibility for noncitizens only, as long as the detention is regularly reviewed by the Immigration and Refugee Board. 12 In 1999, the Court ruled that the commitment of the Convention on the Rights of the Child to the best interests of children does not require any particular recognition in immigration decision making because it is adequately infused into Canadian statutory interpretation. 13 Similarly, the Supreme Court declined to review the Federal Court of Appeal's ruling that Canadian immigration law does not contain a right to family reunification. 14 In 2011, the Court upheld legislation that excludes agricultural workers from unionization and collective bargaining. 15 This ruling is particularly relevant to noncitizens because of its sectoral application. In each of these cases, there are established international human rights commitments that supported the position asserted by the noncitizens before the Court. These arguments were either explicitly rejected or passed over without comment.
Given this pattern of results at the Supreme Court of Canada, a more thorough analysis is warranted to assess whether, indeed, noncitizens in Canada have meaningful access to the international human rights commitments the government of Canada has made. This paper presents the results of one part of a broader research project that seeks to explain the failure of international human rights norms for noncitizens in Canada. The overall project has approached this explanation in three ways. First, I analyze decisions of the highest-level appellate courts (the Supreme Court of Canada and the Federal Court of Appeal); second, I investigate the policy-making work of the national government; and, finally, I look specifically at the work of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. The first tranche of data from the Immigration and Refugee Board is the focus of this paper. 16 During the time frame of this research, the IRB was organized into three divisions, although its structure is set to change to four divisions in December 2011. 17 The largest division is the Refugee Protection Division (RPD), which is responsible for first-instance refugee decisions. The bulk of the work of the Immigration Division is made up of detention reviews (mandated at regular intervals for every person in immigration detention) 18 and inadmissibility hearings (one way of determining whether a noncitizen is barred from entering or remaining in Canada). 19 The Appeal Division primarily hears sponsorship appeals and appeals from removal orders. 20 Approximately sixty percent of all decisions are refugee determinations made by the RPD. 21 appointed to the IRB in varying ways. During the time frame of this research, members of the Refugee Protection Division and the Immigration Appeal Division were appointed through a "governor in council" appointment process designed to ensure independence and security of tenure (for a fixed term). 22 In part because of this appointment process, these divisions have been considered to exercise quasi-judicial power within the Canadian constitutional framework. 23 Members of the Immigration Division are appointed as civil servants. 24 The IRB's mandate is set out in Canada's Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. This legislation, which came into effect in mid-2002, was the first major overhaul of Canada's immigration law framework in a quarter century. One of the innovations of this legislation was that it introduced as one of its objectives the goal of adhering to international human rights commitments. Section 3(3)(f) of the Act states that "[t]his act is to be construed and applied in a manner that . . . complies with international human rights instruments to which Canada is a signatory." This statement is remarkably broad, ostensibly including both instruments that Canada has signed but not ratified and instruments that Canada has ratified but which have not been incorporated by either national or provincial legislatures-key steps for Canada's dualist, federal democracy. The Act also extended protected consolidating reported numbers given for each division. As referenced above, the Annual Performance Reports are available on the IRB webpage at http://www.irbcisr.gc.ca/Eng/brdcom/publications/Pages/index.aspx; some older editions are now archived but are accessible via the same link. person status in Canada beyond those who come within the international refugee definition, to include those who fall within the protections of the Convention Against Torture (CAT). 25 There are two reasons for including the IRB in the broader study. The first is that the overwhelming majority of the decisions that affect the lives of noncitizens in Canada are made by the IRB. Because individuals can only have IRB decisions judicially reviewed by Canada's Federal Court once they have been granted leave, appeal routes from the IRB are starkly limited. In most cases (approximately ninety-eight percent), the IRB decision is the only decision. This is because during the time of this research there was no possible appeal from the IRB decision; and even within the upcoming addition of the Refugee Appeal Division, the appeal avenue remains within the Board. Judicial review can be pursued in the Federal Court only by leave of the court, and leave applications are denied more than eighty percent of the time. 26 And of course, a successful judicial review most often results not in a new decision, but in a new hearing before the IRB.
The second reason for including the IRB is because of section 3(3)(f). This new provision was heralded as an important advance in Canadian Section 97 of IRPA, the (CAT) section, is colloquially referred to as "consolidated grounds" protection. Its formulation is not identical to the (CAT) , and it incorporates aspects of the refugee framework. Section 97 reads in full:
97.
(1) A person in need of protection is a person in Canada whose removal to their country or countries of nationality or, if they do not have a country of nationality, their country of former habitual residence, would subject them personally (a) to a danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of torture within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture; or (b) to a risk to their life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment if (i) the person is unable or, because of that risk, unwilling to avail themself of the protection of that country, (ii) the risk would be faced by the person in every part of that country and is not faced generally by other individuals in or from that country, (iii) the risk is not inherent or incidental to lawful sanctions, unless imposed in disregard of accepted international standards, and (iv) the risk is not caused by the inability of that country to provide adequate health or medical care. immigration law. In the lead up to the new Act taking effect, the IRB did extensive work training decision makers to understand and apply international instruments. 27 The Board itself clearly envisioned that 3(3)(f) would influence its work. Its training materials stated Traditionally, Canadian courts tended to adjudicate cases on the basis of domestic law only. With the advent of the Charter in 1982, reference to international sources has become commonplace. This is a logical development since most of the rights and freedoms protected in the Charter are also contained in international human rights instruments.
The rules of interpretation relating to international law are complex, but generally, there is a common law presumption that Canada's laws are enacted with the intention of giving force to Canada's international obligations. The recognition of Canada's international obligations with respect to persons who need protection because of violations of their human rights is an important feature of the IRPA [Immigration and Refugee Protection Act]. As stated in the legislation, 3. (3) This Act is to be construed and applied in a manner that . . . (f) complies with international human rights instruments to which Canada is a signatory. 28 Beginning in 2002, the Board anticipated a turn towards international human rights law. Accordingly, one objective of this research is to investigate the significance of that turn. My early hypothesis was that there might be an important "high law"-"low law" distinction in Canadian immigration law. 29 of this distinction analyzed the way criminal sanctions were and were not applied in eighteenth century England and the Empire. Hay concluded that there was a meaningful gap between the majesty and power of the law at its highest level, and the deployment of penalties, including the death penalty, for low-level property crimes tried in local courts. What is most compelling about Hay's account is his theorization of reasons for this gap and how this explanation illuminates the role of criminal law in English society.
The difference between the stated approach of the IRB, and the high level outcomes in the Supreme Court of Canada, suggested that a similar gap might exist in Canadian immigration law, which would be important to identify and explain, and which might shed light on the role of international human rights in contemporary Canadian society. Indeed, if international human rights were systematically considered, developed and applied by the IRB, an absence of engagement with these rights at the Supreme Court of Canada level would be considerably less significant, given the dominance of the tribunal in decisions that affect the lives of individuals. Unfortunately, this hypothesis was not borne out in the data set of IRB decisions. The data does not offer the rich terrain for analysis that Hay found in his study, but it is worth reporting nonetheless if primarily to confirm that the lack of engagement with international human rights norms at the Supreme Court of Canada seems to be paralleled at the Board.
II. METHODOLOGY
The basic objective of the IRB part of the project was to examine how the IRB has used international law since the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act came into effect. The first step in this analysis was to gather all the publically available decisions. Relying on publically available decisions is, of course, somewhat problematic. There were approximately 10,000 decisions made public between July 1, 2002, and December 31, 2010. 30 This is a small fraction of the nearly half of a million decisions made by the IRB during that time frame, 31 something smaller than the tip of the iceberg.
30. This number is approximate because we have relied on data base counts, as described in the next paragraph. We did not systematically check all cases that were initially identified in each data base for overlap because the numbers were overwhelming. We did conduct this double check for the nearly one thousand cases ultimately included in our data set.
31. Our table assembling this data appears at supra note 21. The total number of decisions during the time period of our data set is 446,998.
I anticipate, however, that any bias in the choice to make a ruling public will advantage rather than disadvantage our analysis. The IRB publicizes decisions that it considers to be representative of its work, novel, important, or of general public interest. 32 Decisions that are judicially reviewed by the Federal Court are also made public. I believe, therefore, that decisions that have a strong engagement with international human rights norms are more likely to be released publically as they would meet the criteria of novelty, importance, and public interest. In addition, given the IRB's attention to international human rights norms training, I expect that at least in the earliest years of the new legislation, strong engagement with international human rights norms would be considered to put the IRB in a favorable light. For all these reasons, I anticipate that publicly available decisions will either be generally representative of IRB decision-making patterns, or will over-represent the IRB's engagement with international law.
Accordingly, I am confident in my use of publicly available decisions for this purpose, but it is crucial to recognize that, in one important aspect, publicly available decisions will not accurately reflect the IRB's general trends. In the Refugee Protection Division, written decisions are only required for negative decisions, where refugee status is denied. As a decision must first be written (rather than handed down orally) before it even potentially can be made public, negative decisions will be overrepresented. This bias is born out in the data set, where only 6.3 percent of the decisions were positive, compared with a general acceptance rate of refugee claims during this period of close to forty percent. 33 IRB decisions are available in the commercial Quicklaw data base, on the publicly available CanLII service and in the IRB's own "Reflex" data base. 34 A full set of IRB decisions from all divisions was collected from each data base, and then checked for duplication. We searched for all decisions that made reference to any international law. Following a preliminary review, we eliminated from the data set decisions that referred only to the Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol. 35 Convention is the basis of all refugee decisions in Canada. Thus, it can only be under-represented in the data set, as many decision makers refer only to the sections of the Canadian legislation that incorporate the refugee definition from the Convention. After this adjustment, the final data set for analysis included 966 decisions: 907 from the Refugee Protection Division; 40 from the Immigration Appeal Division; and 19 from the Immigration Division.
Once we assembled the data set, we read through each decision and classified it in a number of ways. Most importantly, we coded each case according to its degree of engagement with international law. The categories include the following:
None: where an international instrument is mentioned in either the decision's text or a footnote but there is no discussion at all. Passing reference: the decision maker acknowledges the international instrument and its possible application but there is no substantive discussion. Typically, there is only one sentence. Most of these cases acknowledge and but do not discuss the CAT. Brief analysis: short analysis, usually of the CAT, usually within one paragraph. Discussion of international law: a discussion that extends beyond a mere acknowledgement of the existence of potentially relevant instruments; with at least some linking of the law to the facts at hand. International law influences the outcome: decision maker draws explicitly on international instruments in articulating the decision. This category is usually a subset of the "discussion" category. We also coded each case to identify which international instruments were referenced, which party introduced international law, and what the outcome was.
III. LOOKING AT THE DATA SET
At the highest level, the most surprising and important outcome of this analysis is that the IRB is making scant use of international law. Over the seven and a half years we examined, and considering approximately 10,000 decisions, only 966 made any reference to international law. Of these, a full 691 decisions were found to have no engagement with the international law cited, and a further eighty-five decisions made only a passing reference to some international instrument. The brief analysis category, including only cases where international law had no explicit influence on the decision, accounts for an additional 131 of the cases. This leaves only forty-three cases with a robust discussion of international law, and a mere sixteen decisions where international law influenced the outcome.
The introduction of CAT protection into the Canadian legislation accounts for a significant part of the IRB's overt engagement with international human rights. Especially in the years immediately following 2002, decision makers turned to international texts and standards to work through the implications of this provision. 819 of the decisions refer to CAT. Of these, 656 cases had no engagement with the law and a further forty-four had only a passing reference. Five of the 819 cases were decisions where international law influenced the outcome. However, in four of these cases CAT was only one of several international instruments considered. In the sole case where a discussion of CAT was explicitly stated to be central to the outcome, a young man from Burma (the Canadian government recognizes Myanmar) who had been convicted in absentia of assaulting two police officers was granted refugee status; however, he also would have qualified for protected status on the basis of a risk of torture.
Beyond the CAT cases, a wide range of international instruments were considered or referenced in the data set. Thirty-seven different instruments were at least referenced. The Convention on the Rights of the Child 36 had the second most frequent citations with fifty-one, a marked drop below CAT. 37 Six instruments were referenced between ten and thirty times (in descending order): the Rome Statute, 38 44 In part, this likely demonstrates a "learning effect" in the Tribunal-decision makers are more likely to refer to international law given novel situations-which I discuss further in the next section. At this point, it is important to point out that patterns in references to international law do not match up directly with numbers of decisions overall. For example, the three years in the data set with the lowest number of both IRB decisions generally and There were two important trends in the data set regarding the overall effects of international law. The first is that a discussion of international law correlates with a positive outcome for the individual. Even in this data set, which is dominated by negative refugee decisions, this trend is discernable. Of the forty-three cases where there was a robust discussion of international law, the claimant was successful in eleven instances. This success rate of more than twenty-five percent is a marked distinction from the 6.3 percent overall in the data set. A similar trend is observable in cases where international law influences the outcome, but since the numbers are so small (five of sixteen cases), translating to percentages is not particularly meaningful. The second trend, which makes the first even more remarkable, is that discussion of international human rights norms is closely tied to refugee exclusions and immigrant inadmissibility. That is, when decision makers are looking to exclude an individual either because of some type of criminality listed in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, or under the Refugee Convention's 1F provisions (the three categories of which concern international criminality, serious nonpolitical crimes, and acts contrary to the purposes of the United Nations), international law is often referenced. 46 
Article 1(F) states,
The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that: (a) He has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against This is not in itself surprising, but it would be heartening to see a balanced use of international human rights norms to, for example, analyze the meaning of persecution within refugee law as well. Persecution is the linchpin of the refugee definition. 47 Given that this key term is not defined in the Convention, it has been the focus of extensive jurisprudential and scholarly attention. Following James C. Hathaway's seminal 1991 text, The Law of Refugee Status, 48 the trend in common law jurisdictions at least has been to interpret persecution by reference to international human right standards. Hathaway's paradigm offered the now generally accepted proposition that refugee law was to provide surrogate human norms. In two cases, international law was explicitly found to be determinative on the basis of a brief discussion only. This finding may also indicate that the distinction between our final two categorizations does not always capture a difference in level of reliance on international law. 49 Five of these cases were Immigration Division admissibility proceedings. In every one of these cases, the applicant was found to be inadmissible. 50 Analysis of international law was used in reaching the conclusion that the individual was inadmissible on the basis of humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes; (b) He has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee; (c) He has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137. 47. A refugee is defined in the Convention as one who, As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. Id. at art. 1(A)(2).
48. JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS (1991). 49. Further, of the forty-three cases with a robust discussion of international law, nine occurred in the Immigration Appeal Division. However, in no case did the decision maker state that international law was a reason or a contributing factor to the conclusion on any issue decided in the case. international criminality. 51 In four of the cases, the specific issue was whether "people smuggling" could be classified as a "transnational crime," the wording that is required under section 37 (1)(b) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. 52 Interestingly, these cases did not cluster in the early years of the data set; two were decided in 2004, and two in 2009. 53 Three of the four cases involve people smuggling from Canada into the United States, and the individuals range from someone who had been convicted of smuggling in American criminal proceedings to someone who is clearly "not a professional people smuggler." 54 The final Immigration Division case involved a former member of the El Salvadoran army who was found to be inadmissible on the basis of his involvement in crimes against humanity-the meaning of which was determined by international standards. 55 The other eleven cases were in the Refugee Protection Division. In five of these cases, the international law analysis was linked to an exclusion issue; in this respect the decisions are very similar to the Immigration Division rulings. 56 However, only two of the five claimants were excluded. 57 In the other three cases, the decision maker's analysis of international law led to the conclusion that the individual was not excludable. Although the numbers here are very small, this finding is almost remarkable in and of itself, as once an exclusion issue is raised, the state prevails in almost ninety percent of cases. 58 Another group of five decisions were in cases that, for one reason or another, were atypical of refugee claims in Canada. Three of the claimants involved were citizens of the United States and no U.S. citizen has ever been granted refugee status in Canada. 59 The fourth case involved a Haitian national child who had arrived in Canada with a woman he later found out was not his mother. 60 He had no knowledge of either of his biological parents and had slipped through a loophole in the provision of Canadian citizenship law that is designed to offer a nationality to abandoned children. The final case that I would assess as atypical was that of a married couple who were a Jordanian and a stateless Palestinian, both of whom were granted refugee protection on the basis that their international human right to found a family was breached because neither Jordan nor Israel would allow them to regularize their immigration status as a couple. 61 This set of cases uses international human rights standards in the role where we would typically expect to find them: in assessing novel facts to analyze the risk of being persecuted. The three remaining cases conform to more "ordinary" refugee claim fact patterns in Canada: the case of the above-mentioned Burmese national fleeing torture; a redetermination of a refugee claim by a man who had been captured by the Shining Path group in Peru and was found not to be excluded because he participated in crimes against humanity only under duress; 62 and the case of a woman fleeing horrific domestic violence, including the rape of one of her daughters. 63 
IV. CONCLUSION: UNDERSTANDING THESE OUTCOMES
The most interesting part of the exercise begins at this point. The overwhelming finding that the largest decision-making body for noncitizens in Canada makes very little use of international human rights norms is open to a number of explanations.
One potential hypothesis-which is reflected in important statements of the Supreme Court of Canada-is that international human rights norms are so completely infused into domestic Canadian law that explicit references to them would be unnecessary and therefore unlikely. 64 I have rejected this hypothesis for three reasons. First, rulings at the Supreme Court level in noncitizen cases (another part of this study) do not support this idea. Second, within this data set, individual outcomes tended to be more positive when international norms were explicitly referenced and discussed, suggesting that this factor is not "neutral" to decision making. Third, there is widespread concern in the advocacy community that noncitizens in Canada have inadequate access to international human rights norms. This concern is bolstered by recent findings by international human rights bodies that Canada has breached international human rights obligations towards The values and principles of the Convention recognize the importance of being attentive to the rights and best interests of children when decisions are made that relate to and affect their future. In addition, the preamble, recalling the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, recognizes that "childhood is entitled to special care and assistance." A similar emphasis on the importance of placing considerable value on the protection of children and their needs and interests is also contained in other international instruments. The United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1959), in its preamble, states that the child "needs special safeguards and care." The principles of the Convention and other international instruments place special importance on protections for children and childhood, and on particular consideration of their interests, needs, and rights.
noncitizens, and by the absence of any governmental response to these rulings. 65 A second hypothesis is that this methodology misrepresents what is actually taking place in the tribunal. For the reasons I discussed above, I believe that misrepresentation is likely. However, it is likely to overrepresent the use of international law in the tribunal rather than the inverse. There are several other factors that contribute to appropriately interpreting these decisions. IRB decision makers work in a very stressful environment with high workloads. A significant proportion of them are not legally trained, and they rely on a legal services support division to supply legal analysis and conclusions. IRB decisions are usually quite brief and focus closely on the key issues. All of these factors may contribute to a reason-writing atmosphere where international law may be relied on but not explicitly articulated.
This reason-writing atmosphere is closely intertwined with what can be called a "learning effect." It is clearly observable in our data set that decision makers are more likely to discuss international norms when the norms are newly relevant. This accounts in part-and in slightly differing ways-for both the pattern of engagement with CAT, and for the preponderance of novel cases among those where the decision turns on international law. While the number of Refugee Protection Decisions that rely on section 97 has been approximately consistent over the time of the data set, references to CAT have dropped markedly in recent years. A plausible explanation for this pattern is that as decision makers have become more familiar and comfortable with the provisions of CAT, there is less and less reason to refer directly to this instrument. The preponderance issue is, of course, explained inversely. When novel facts arise, decision makers are more likely to make appropriate recourse to international human rights standards to analyze potential new instances of persecution that may fit within the refugee definition.
Accordingly, the question of misrepresentation of what is happening in the IRB must be understood in two ways. First, as stated earlier, publically available decisions likely do over-represent (on a simple percentage basis) the number of cases where international human rights norms are explicitly referenced. However, it is also likely the case that decision makers think about international human rights norms more often than they refer to them. This second effect could be called a citation bias in this study's methodology. That is, the study can only record that to which the decision maker explicitly refers. This is an important point, and it is excessively formalistic to insist that any relevant influence must be explicitly recorded. It is impossible to quantify what the extent of this bias may be, but, given the exceptionally low number of references to international law, a "citationbias factor" is not able to counter the overall conclusions drawn here.
The question of misrepresentation generally is a provocative one. For this reason, as a second step in this study, I plan to conduct interviews with IRB decision makers, managers, and legal services staff. This qualitative analysis will hopefully shed some additional light on the question of how representative the publicly available decisions actually are. I have already investigated whether the use of international instruments is tracked internally, but unfortunately this is not the case.
A third potentially relevant factor could be that lawyers are not raising international law arguments. We did attempt to track this through our data set by coding the cases according to whether the international law was introduced by the individual, the state, or the decision maker. Unfortunately, the results of this coding were not particularly helpful. In eighty-eight percent of cases, the international law appears to have been raised by the decision makers. However, given the nature of IRB reasons-concise and tightly focused-I think this conclusion is unlikely to be reliable. It also does not track with anecdotal analysis from immigration lawyers. It is very difficult to devise a more accurate study of this factor, as bad immigration lawyers-those least likely to raise the greatest possible array of relevant and appropriate arguments-are also the least likely to participate in a research project. Observational research is impossible because of high volumes and in camera hearings, and written argumentation is often not submitted to the tribunal.
The marked decline in reliance on international law in the most recent years may also have explanations beyond the learning effect. While it is certainly likely that in the earliest years of the new legislation decision makers felt a greater need to grapple directly with the international instruments, other factors are also relevant. It may be that the interest in international norms declined following the Federal Court of Appeal's ruling that section 3(3)(f) was essentially a codification of existing statutory interpretation practice in Canada and thus would not have the reach that some had envisioned for it. 66 This decision was handed down in October 2005, so the drop off in number of cases referring to international law had already commenced. Nonetheless, this decision may have some explanatory value. Finally, the failure of appellate courts at the highest levels in Canada to turn to international human rights norms in immigration matters may have subtly communicated to the IRB that initial efforts to engage with international law are simply not necessary.
In de Guzman, Justice Evans concluded on behalf of the court:
Paragraph 3(3)(f) should be interpreted in light of the modern developments in courts' use of international human rights law as interpretative aids. Thus, like other statutes, IRPA must be interpreted and applied in a manner that complies with "international human rights instruments to which Canada is signatory" that are binding because they do not require ratification or Canada has signed and ratified them. These include the two instruments on which counsel for Ms de Guzman relied heavily in this appeal, namely, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Thus, a legally binding international human rights instrument to which Canada is signatory is determinative of how IRPA must be interpreted and applied, in the absence of a contrary legislative intention. However, paragraph 3(3)(f) also applies to non-binding instruments to which Canada is signatory. Because the only international instruments relevant to this case are legally binding on Canada, it is not necessary to decide here the effect of paragraph 3(3)(f) with respect to non-binding international human rights instruments. However, in view of the considerations outlined above regarding such instruments, I am inclined to think that Parliament intended them to be used as persuasive and contextual factors in the interpretation and application of IRPA, and not as determinative (emphasis added). Moreover, of these non-binding instruments, not all will necessarily be equally persuasive. This view of paragraph 3(3)(f) also derives support from the Supreme Court of Canada's jurisprudence, to the extent that in the Public Service Employee Relations; Slaight Communications; Baker and Spraytech cases, the Court indicated that it was prepared to give a persuasive and contextual role to non-binding international human rights law in the interpretation of domestic law. Despite all of these potential explanatory factors, the numbers in the data set are incredibly stark. In searching for engagement with international human rights norms in decision making about noncitizens in Canada, some trace of international law was found in less than ten percent of publicly available decisions. An engagement that was more than a "passing reference" was found in only two percent of the cases, and reliance on international law as a central aspect of the decision was infinitesimally small at 0.16 percent of cases.
This matters for a number of reasons. First, to return to my starting point, there are many good reasons to think that Canada is likely to be as good as it gets for noncitizen access to international human rights. If that is right, the results are a dismal showing indeed. Second, legal scholars of globalization have heralded the decline of citizenship rights and the rise of international human rights. These findings suggest that this transition is far from realized in Canada. Third, this study shows that Canada's international posture with regard to human rights is at odds with its own practice. This is not surprising to Canadian legal scholars and immigration lawyers, but it is not well understood either within Canada or beyond. Finally, this study also clearly shows that decision makers in all divisions of the IRB are able to engage with international human rights norms, and that the scope for more thorough engagement exists. There is no barrier to this engagement, and given both the recent rulings of the Supreme Court of Canada and the overwhelming importance of the IRB for noncitizens, international human rights advocacy before the IRB is more important than ever.
